Illicit Trade of Cigarettes in South Africa

Illicit cigarette sales in South Africa surpassed legal tobacco product sales in 2020 and stayed above that level in 2021 and 2022. In 2022, illicit trade accounted for 58% of the market.

Most illicit cigarettes in South Africa are produced domestically.

South Africa lost R15 billion in excise revenue and R3 billion in VAT revenue due to illicit cigarette trade in 2022.

Illicit tobacco trade refers to the production, import, export, distribution, purchase, sale, or possession of a tobacco product in contravention of the law. This trade also includes the sale of smuggled genuine or counterfeit cigarettes. This page:

Discusses the levels of illicit tobacco trade in South Africa

Defines types of illicit tobacco trade in South Africa

Discusses the drivers and threats of illicit tobacco trade

Highlights the role of transnational tobacco companies in illicit trade

Discusses the geography of South Africa’s illicit tobacco trade

Examines and addresses myths promoted by the tobacco industry

Suggests methods to reduce illicit trade and highlights success stories from other countries in combating illicit trade

To learn more about the data and methods used in this page, click here.

58%

The estimated percentage of illicit cigarette trade in South Africa in 2022

R18 billion

Government revenue lost due to illicit cigarette trade in 2022

Illicit Production

a. Production at illegal facilities

Cigarettes and other tobacco products are manufactured at illegal facilities. These cigarettes may not meet health and packaging regulations. Counterfeit cigarettes infringe upon intellectual property rights of companies who own the rights to the brand. No excise tax or VAT is paid on these products.

b. Production at legal facilities

i. Under-declaring: Manufacturers produce more than they report to the tax authorities. These cigarettes are sold in South Africa without paying excise duties and VAT. For instance, “factories in South Africa operate double shifts, running their machines at night, and/or they hide the true scale of their production by paying off customs officials and using fraudulent paperwork. They make use of all the available gaps in SARS’s monitoring of their ‘bond’ warehouses, for example reusing invoices for multiple deliveries”.

ii. Ghost exports: Manufacturers declare some production for export, exempting them from excise duties and VAT. These products are instead diverted to the South African market without paying tax.

Illicit Import/Export

a. Smuggling

Products are illegally traded across borders without paying taxes. Both legal and illegal tobacco products can be smuggled. They are brought into the country at both legal and illegal entry points without paying import duties and are then sold without paying excise duties or VAT. These products may or may not meet health or other legal requirements.

b. Bootlegging

Small-scale smuggling where an individual purchases cigarettes in one country, where the taxes are low, and sells them in another country where taxes are higher.

c. In Transit

Tobacco products are produced for export by a legitimate manufacturer but are smuggled to a different country en route without paying any tax.

Ref 15 Ref 15 Ref 16 Ref 16 Ref 16 Ref 17 Ref16 Ref17

The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) was adopted by the Parties to the FCTC in November 2012. The ITP complements and expands Parties’ obligations under Article 15 of the FCTC. There are at least 63 Parties to the ITP, which entered into force on September 25, 2018. In general, the ITP obligates Parties to:

Identify, verify, and license players in the tobacco supply chain, or equivalent systems.

Track and trace products throughout the supply chain and prevent the diversion of tobacco into the illicit market.

Enforce record-keeping requirements for the tobacco industry and government.

Regulate sales by Internet, phone, and other new technologies, as well as sales in tax- and duty-free zones.

Establish and implement criminal laws to combat illicit trade by specifying liability for violations, search and seizure procedures, and procedures for destroying confiscated illegal products and equipment.

Ensure international cooperation — including information sharing and coordination — between law enforcement, prosecutors, scientists, administrators, and other officials and agencies.

Link to WHO FCTC Protocol

The illicit tobacco market is a global problem and requires a global solution

Global strategies are essential in the fight against illicit tobacco. Currently, only a limited number of frameworks exist, such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and WHO Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products aims to eliminate all forms of illicit tobacco trade, in accordance with the terms of Article 15 of the WHO FCTC. It provides guidance for preventing illicit trade, such as an international track and trace system, law enforcement measures, and international cooperation.

South Africa was one of the first countries to sign the Protocol in 2013, but has not yet ratified it. Ratification is important because it legally obliges the country to implement the provisions of the protocol. To prevent this illegal trade, the Protocol aims to make the supply chain of tobacco products secure through a series of measures by governments. It requires that within five years of ratification, countries establish a global tracking and tracing regime comprising national and regional tracking and tracing systems and a global information sharing point located in the Secretariat of the WHO FCTC. Other provisions to ensure control of the supply chain include licensing, record keeping requirements, and regulation of Internet sales, duty-free sales, and international transit. Read more about the Protocol.

Recommended Approaches

to Combating Illicit Trade in South Africa


The extensive South African border (1840 km in length) poses a substantial enforcement challenge in preventing illicit tobacco trade, as it is estimated to have around 96 illegal points of entry – of which more than half are with Zimbabwe.

South Africa is the main destination country for illicit cigarettes that are smuggled from source points such as Zimbabwe.

Neighbouring countries, such as Lesotho, have customs and excise controls that are perceived to be relatively weak. Thus, these countries can be used as a destination market for round tripping, which involves creating fake destinations (exports) for products that are kept and most probably sold locally. 

The contraband enters South Africa from Zimbabwe through two general types of smuggling operations: small-scale entrepreneurial operations or organised smuggling networks. The small-scale operations make use of informal border-crossing points in the bush, which are abundant at the Limpopo River border. These points of entry are crossed by runners (mostly unemployed men) between midnight and 03:00 a.m. These runners use backpacks or plastic bags to transport the contraband, and when border patrol officials are encountered, a bribe is often offered to avert any scrutiny. This method of smuggling has become more popular due to the installation of truck scanners that can detect tobacco.

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Myth: An increase in taxes leads to an increase in illicit trade.


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Fact: Independent research shows increasing tobacco taxes does not necessarily increase illicit trade.

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Myth: Illicit cigarettes are only manufactured by local South African companies.


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Fact: Both local and international companies contribute to the illicit tobacco trade in South Africa.

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Myth: Illicit trade occurs primarily in the townships of South Africa.


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Fact: Buyers of illicit tobacco products can be found throughout the country.

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Myth: The tobacco industry provides reliable data.


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Fact: The tobacco industry consistently produces unreliable data and frequently fails to state the source or research methodology.

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Myth: Codentify/INEXTO Suite is an established and effective alternative to track and trace systems.


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Fact: Codentify/INEXTO Suite is not a true track and trace system and cannot be relied on because it is owned by the tobacco industry.

Kenya’s Track and Trace System increased excise tax revenue.

Kenya implemented a track and trace system in 2013, resulting in a 20% increase in excise tax revenue between 2013 and 2016.

The Kenyan Revenue Authority estimates that the illicit cigarette trade market share declined from 12% in 2013 to 5% in 2016, a direct result of the implementation of track and trace measures.

Georgia decreased the size of the illicit tobacco market (while increasing taxes).

In Georgia, almost 50% of cigarettes sold between 2000 and 2010 were illicit. Georgia successfully implemented progressive economic reforms in its revenue and customs services, including requiring tax stamps on all tobacco products. Currently, these are only used for tracing, though they have the capability of being used for both tracking and tracing.

As a result, illicit cigarette consumption fell to 1.5% of total consumption in 2018. This reduction in illicit consumption coincided with significant increases in Georgian excise taxes.

Romania improved tobacco-control enforcement and reduced illicit trade.

In early 2010, 19% to 30% of tobacco in Romania was purchased on the illicit market. To combat this, Romania took steps to improve the enforcement of tobacco-control policies. In the first phase, from 2010 to 2012, they aimed to:

• create a better legislative framework;
• strengthen the administrative capacity of customs; and
• focus on specific and more effective controls to curb cigarette smuggling.

By the end of 2013, the size of the illicit market had decreased to 11.4% of the total market.

The United Kingdom was able to decrease illicit trade and reduce smoking prevalence while increasing tobacco taxes.

In the United Kingdom (UK), the sale of illicit tobacco products was estimated in the year 2000 to have caused a loss of £3 billion in tax revenue. The tobacco industry has often argued that increases in tobacco taxes lead to increases in illicit trade. While tax and price differences in neighbouring countries/regions may increase the incentives for illicit trade, the UK experience shows that a comprehensive tobacco control strategy can increase government revenues through higher tobacco taxes, achieve significant reductions in smoking, and successfully reduce levels of illicit trade. The UK experience shows that contrary to the tobacco industry’s argument, increases in tobacco taxes are not the reason for increases in the illicit trade in tobacco. When accompanied by comprehensive tobacco control laws, illicit trade in tobacco can be controlled and reduced, in spite of higher taxes, through improved tax administration and enforcement of tax laws.

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